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INTRODUCTION
There has been a dramatic rise in the last thirty years toward the adoption
of the bank holding company ("BHC") structure by banks. Inherent in this
trend is an apparent accepted orthodoxy about the need of such structures
from both a business and regulatory perspective. The percentage of U.S.
banks owned by BHCs has more than doubled since 1980, from 34.3% to
* V. Gerard Comizio, Chair and Partner, Global Banking Practice, Paul Hastings
LLP and Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
** Associate, Global Banking Practice, Paul Hastings LLP.
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approximately 84% today.1 Notably, though, federal banking agencies
("FBAs") do not require banks to form a BHC.2 Thus, the uptick in BHC-
owned banks has largely been driven by perceived legal, regulatory, and
business advantages. Since 1980, the majority of banks presumably (1)
identified significant advantages to forming a BHC that outweighed the
increased costs of corporate governance and regulatory compliance and/or
(2) saw their peers forming BHCs and generally accepted this industry
trend as the orthodoxy of modem banking organization structure.
Percent of Banks Owned by BHCs
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Figure 1. Showing the percentage of bank ownership by BHCs from Dec. 1980 to
Dec. 2007.
Despite the emergence of BHCs as the "must have" organizational
structure for the banking industry, approximately 16% of banks have opted
to remain outside of the BHC structure. This statistic suggests at the very
least that, for certain banks, the perceived advantages of forming a BHC
are not compelling. More significantly, the 16% rate of hold-outs suggests
that the BHC structure's advantages do not always outweigh the structure's
ever-increasing bank regulatory compliance and corporate governance
1. Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, P'SHIP FOR
PROGRESS, https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/grow-shareholder-value/ba
nk-holding-companies (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
2. See id. (encouraging organizations to individually consider the advisability of
forming a BHC and noting that the Federal Reserve is neutral on their creation).
3. See id. (follow "Bank Ownership by BHCs Dec. 1980 to Dec. 2007"
hyperlink) ("The black bars in the chart above represent the number of commercial
banks in the U.S. at year-end 1980 and every five years since then and at year-end
2012, while the green bars show the number of banks owned by BHCs during the same
time periods. The red line shows the percentage of banks owned by BHCs, which
increased sharply in the early 1980s as the movement to form BHCs gained
momentum; this movement has continued to increase gradually, but steadily, before
declining slightly in recent years.").
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costs, particularly as a result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). Notably, the banks that have
avoided forming a BHC are not limited to one particular size or business
model. Instead, the hold-out banks range from small community banks
with less than $10 billion in total assets,4 to mid-sized banks with $30
billion in total assets and a number of non-bank subsidiaries engaged in
broker-dealer and investment advisory activities,5 and to large regional
banks with total assets exceeding $50 billion.6 The diversity of these hold-
outs calls into question the need for a BHC.
As a general matter, the U.S. banking industry's BHC structure "is
unique" in comparison to the generally BHC-less European banking model,
and the U.S. model did not emerge until 1956. 7  The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 ("BHC Act") established BHCs and defined the
"terms and conditions under which a company can own a bank in the
U.S." 8 While initially BHCs could engage in only a limited range of
activities, over time, the BHC Act was amended to significantly expand the
4. See, e.g., Bank Information - Northwest Bank, FDIC,
https://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=28178&name=Northwest%20Bank
&searchName=Northwest&searchFdic=&city=&state=&zip=&address=&searchWithin
=&activeFlag-&tabld=l (follow "Financials" hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 6, 2016)
(indicating that Northwest Bank has less than $10 billion in total assets);
Bank Information - Opus Bank, FDIC, https://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?
bank=33806&name=Opus%20Bank&searchName=Opus&searchFdic=&city-&state =
&zip=&address=&searchWithin=&activeFlag=&tabld= 1 (follow "Financials"
hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 6, 2016) (indicating that Opus Bank has less than $10
billion dollars in total assets).
5. See, e.g., Bank Information of Signature Bank, FDIC,
https://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank=57053&name=Signature%2OBank
&searchName=Signature&searchFdic=&city-&state=&zip=&address=&searchWithin
=&activeFlag=&tabld=l) (follow "Financials" hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 6, 2016
(indicating that Signature Bank has a little over $30 billion in total assets); see also
About Signature Bank Overview, SIGNATURE BANK, https://www.signatureny.com/abo
ut-us/about-signature-bank (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (stating that a subsidiary of
Signature Bank, Signature Securities Group Corporation, is a licensed broker dealer
and investment adviser).
6. See, e.g., Bank Information of First Republic Bank, FDIC, https://research.
fdic.gov/bankfind/detail.html?bank59017&name=First%20Republic%2OBank&searc
hName=First%20Republic&searchFdic=&city-&state=&zip=&address=&searchWithi
n=&activeFlag=&tabld=l (follow "Financials" hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 6, 2016)
(indicating that First National Bank has over $50 billion in total assets); see also
Company Profile, First Republic, https://www.firstrepublic.com/aboutus/company
profile (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (listing the different regions where First Republic
Bank offers its services).
7. Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, supra note 1.
See generally Tatiana V. Tkacheneko, Legal Status of Bank Holding Companies
(BHCs): U.S. and European Bankruptcy Issues, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 573,
594 (2010).
8. Id.
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range of permissible activities.9 During the late 1980s and 1990s, a BHC's
range of permissible activities dwarfed the scope of activities permissible
for a bank without a BHC.'0 During the late 1990s and early 2000s,
however, the powers of banks gradually expanded," substantially
narrowing this gap.
While the perceived advantages of BHCs over banks have been steadily
eroding, the regulatory burdens imposed on BHCs have been significantly
increasing, especially following the 2010 enactment of Dodd-Frank.'2
Given the growing regulatory burden on BHCs in conjunction with the
expanding range of activities that banks may engage in without them, the
BHC structure may no longer be the most advantageous corporate structure
for many banks, especially those engaged primarily in banking and certain
financial services activities.
This Article explores whether the BHC model remains a compelling
organizational structure for the majority of banks in light of the steady
erosion of the gap between BHC-permissible activities and bank-
permissible activities combined with the ever-mounting BHC regulatory
compliance costs. Part II will review an organization's fiduciary duty to
consider the optimal corporate structure. Part III will review the evolution
of BHC and bank powers. Part IV will evaluate the shrinking advantages
of forming a BHC. Part V will assess the mounting regulatory burdens
BHCs face in a post-Dodd-Frank regulatory environment. Part VI will
review the remaining advantages of BHCs. Part VII will offer some
conclusions regarding the merits of the BHC structure for community and
regional banks.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES REGARDING BHC STRUCTURE
As a general matter, one of a corporation's primary objectives is to
conduct its business activities to maximize corporate profit and shareholder
9. Dafna Avraham et al., A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 65, 67 (2012), https://www.newyork
fed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12vl8n2/1207avra.pdf; see also 12 C.F.R §
225.84 (2015).
10. See supra note 9.
11. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, COMPENDIUM OF ACTIVITIES
PERMISSIBLE FOR A NAT'L BANK 1 (Apr. 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20160114
100143/http:/www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-pubications-report
s/bankact.pdf (on file with author); Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider,
Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The. Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC
BANKING REV. 1, 3 (2006), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006mar/art
iclel/articlel .pdf (discussing how states enacted statutes that allowed state-chartered
banks to engage in all activities permitted national banks).
12. Avraham et al., supra note 9.
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gain.13  Thus, director leadership responsibilities include informed
decision-making regarding corporate policies and strategic goals. From a
fiduciary prospective, bank management bears a responsibility to
periodically review its corporate governance structure. 14 The FBAs have
emphasized that "financial institutions are encouraged to 'periodically
review their policies and procedures related to corporate governance and
auditing matters."" 5 In addition, fiduciary duty requires management to
periodically "evaluate which corporate governance policies and procedures
are more appropriate [for an institution's] size, operations and resources.", 6
In this context, a corporate governance review should include an
assessment of regulatory compliance and corporate governance costs and a
consideration of what corporate structure is optimal for the entity to best
maximize profitability, streamline regulatory burdens-consistent with the
institution's business plans-and operate safely and soundly. 7  As
discussed infra, given the decreasing advantages and mounting compliance
costs associated with BHCs, banks should evaluate the relative merits of
maintaining a BHC.
III. THE EVOLVING POWERS OF BHCs AND BANKS
In the middle of the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress passed and
President Roosevelt signed into law the Banking Act of 1933, commonly
referred to as "Glass-Steagall," which was intended to forever separate
commercial and investment banking.' 8 After the 1929 stock market crash
and resulting Great Depression, Congress worried that commercial banks
"were incurring losses from volatile equity markets" and sought to prevent
the limited bank credit available from being used for speculation; rather,
Congress believed bank credit should be directed toward "more productive
13. THE CLEARINGHOUSE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING BANK
ORGANIZATION'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EXPOSURE DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
9 (Sept. 10, 2014); see also AM. BANKERS ASS'N., THE BOARD'S ROLE IN STRATEGIC
PLANNING (2004); Am. Bar Ass'n, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 56 Bus. LAW.
1517, 1578 (2001).
14. See AM. BANKERS ASS'N., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR MUTUALS 2, 8
(2007), https://www.aba.com/Tools/BankType/Mutual/Documents/CorporateGovernan
ceforMutuals.pdf. ("Proper corporate governance is essential to the fulfillment of
directors' and officers' fiduciary duties .... [I]t is a valuable exercise to reexamine the
provisions of the charter and bylaws in order to determine whether these documents
provide for structures and procedures, which, in the best judgment of management,
facilitate effective corporate governance. . .
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 2, 8.
18. Julia Mauers, Banking Act of 1933, FED. RES. HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25.
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uses, such as industry, commerce and agriculture. ' 9 Upon the enactment
of Glass-Steagall, national banks were prohibited from underwriting or
dealing in securities, and their activities were generally limited to accepting
deposits and making loans. 20  The companies owning banks, however,
could own a wide range of non-bank firms, allowing them to engage in
substantially more activities than permitted for banks under Glass-
Steagall.21
in 1956, the BHC Act was enacted and imposed conditions and
22
restrictions on the companies owning banks (i.e. BHCs). Under the BHC
Act, BHCs became subject to regulation and supervision by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve") 23 and
were restricted from participating, directly or through subsidiaries, in non-
traditional banking activities. 24 Unlike the Glass-Steagall enactment, and
the Section 619 of Dodd-Frank (the "Volcker Rule") enactment25 -which
has been criticized as restricting activity that not only did not cause the
financial crisis but poses relatively little risk to the insurance fund of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")26-- the BHC Act's
enactment stemmed not from any identified abuse in the banking system
but rather as "a solution in search of a problem.,
27
Although the BHC Act initially imposed similar activity restrictions on
BHCs as Glass-Steagall imposed on banks, subsequent legislation and
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Joe Mahon, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, FED. RES. HISTORY (Nov. 22,
2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/31.
22. See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, supra
note 1.
23. Id.
24. Avraham et al., supra note 9.
25. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
26. Philip Swagel, A Modest Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/a-modest-volcker-rule/? r-O
(criticizing the Volcker Rule as restricting activity that was not "an especially
important factor behind the recent financial crisis" and noting that it generally imposes
relatively little risk to the federal government as it involves relatively little FDIC
insured funds).
27. See e.g., 101 Cong. Rec. 7957 (1955) (statement of Rep. Harris Ellsworth)
("We did not hear any testimony in our committee to the effect that [the BHC Act] was
for the purpose of correcting any present or existing difficulties."); Mehrsa Baradaran,
Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 385,
395 (2012) (explaining that the BHC Act was enacted as a preventative measure-"to
stop the feared expansion of Transamerica into a national banking conglomerate"-
rather that as a reaction to identified abuse within the banking system); see also
Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking Commerce Under the Bank Holding
Company Act - A Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 163, 166
(1983).
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actions by the FBAs gradually expanded the permissible activities of BHCs
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.28  These expansions offered
substantial advantages to banks operating within the BHC structure.
During the 1990s and 2000s, however, the powers of banks likewise began
to evolve, gradually reducing the number of activities that only BHCs
could conduct. 29 This gap was even further narrowed in 2013, when the
Volker Rule substantially restricted the ability of BHCs to engage in certain
securities and investment activities.
30
A. The Trajectory of BHC Powers: What Goes up Must Come (Partially)
Down
The 1970 amendments to the BHC Act marked the first fissure in the
31legal barrier between traditional banking and financial activities. Under
the 1970 amendments, BHCs obtained authority to own shares of any
company engaged in activities "so closely related to banking or managing
or controlling banks as to be proper incident thereto., 32 This new power
enabled BHCs to invest in a slightly wider range of financial companies.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the FBAs further extended the scope of
"closely related to banking" activities to ensure the U.S. banking industry's
continued viability in the "increasingly competitive" financial markets.
33
The Federal Reserve, for example, began interpreting Section 20 of the
BHC Act-which prohibited BHCs from owning or controlling more than
50% of a company (or the majority of its directors) that engages principally
in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or otherwise distributing
securities 34-to allow BHCs to develop "significant securities operations
28. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call A
Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United
States, 31 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 125-26 n.41 (2012) (citing cases and
other authority that suggest that, in 1978, "the Federal Reserve gradually expanded the
range of securities activities permissible to BHCs' non-bank subsidiaries" and that, in
1987, "the Federal Reserve permitted BHCs' to underwrite and deal in corporate
securities through Section 20 subsidiaries, subject to the revenue limitation, which was
gradually increased to twenty-five percent of a securities subsidiary's gross annual
revenue").
29. See OCC, supra note 11.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1851; 12 C.F.R. §§ 248.3, 248.10 (2015).
31. See generally The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970).
32. Id. § 103(4), 84 Stat. at 1765.
33. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 125. See generally Saule T. Omarova,
The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking", 63
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (analyzing the OCC's gradual evolution related to its
interpretation of regulations to allow banks to engage in a widening range of financial
activities).
34. R. DANIEL PACE, LIMITATIONS ON THE BUSINESS OF BANKING: AN ANALYSIS OF
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through the establishment of so-called "Section 20" subsidiaries. 35
The legislation of the 1970s and the FBAs' regulatory interpretations of
the 1980s and 1990s caused a crack in the BHC Act's barrier between
commercial and investment banking. In 1999, upon the enactment of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the "GLBA"), this crack became a hole wide
enough for BHCs to engage in a range of non-traditional banking
activities.36 Under the GLBA, BHCs had the power to register as financial
holding companies, which were allowed to "engage in a broad range of
financial activities, including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance
underwriting, and merchant banking activities." 37 Moreover, BHCs could
now own securities firms and insurance firms.38 In the wake of the GLBA,
the BHC structure offered substantial advantages to banks. Through the
BHC structure, banks could be part of an organization engaged in a far
more expansive range of activities than banks could engage in on their
own.
39
This steady trend of BHC power expansion came to an abrupt halt
following the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which former Federal
Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke has described as "the worst financial
crisis in global history, including the Great Depression. 'AO Enacted in the
aftermath of, and in response to, the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank
"represent[ed] a significant shift toward strengthening regulations
governing financial service providers and restricting the scope of activities
that BHCs may engage in.",4 1 The Volcker Rule, in particular, has shrunk
the scope of permissible BHC activities, prohibiting all banking entities
from engaging in proprietary trading (short term trading of financial
instruments on the banking entity's own account) and investing in or
exercising control over certain types of funds (e.g., hedge funds and
commodity pools). 4 2 Moreover, the Federal Reserve has the authority, and
EXPANDED SECURITIES, INSURANCE AND REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 12-14 (2012).
35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
36. Avraham et al., supra note 9; see also 12 C.F.R, § 225.84(b)(1) (2013).
37. Avraham et al., supra note 9; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1843(k)(1)(A).
38. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 30, at 121; see also Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (2012).
39. Joe Mahon, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Commonly Called
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FED. RES. HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federal
reservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/53.
40. Matt Egan, 2008: Worse than the Great Depression?, CNN MONEY (Aug. 27,
2014, 5:34 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/O8/27/news/economy/ben-bernanke-great-
depression/.
41. Avraham et al., supra note 9.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1851; 12 C.F.R. §§ 248.3, 248.10 (2015). We note that these
restrictions apply to banks as well as to BHCs.
Vol. 5:2
2016 RE VISITING THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY STR UCTURE 197
is considering exercising such authority, to further constrain the scope of
permissible BHC activities.
43
B. The Slow but Steady Expansion of Bank Powers
As the powers of BHCs expanded in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the
scope of activities permissible for banks and their subsidiaries through the
late 1990s and 2000s expanded as well. Today, national banks and their
operating subsidiaries are permitted to engage in a broad array of financial
activities previously reserved for BHCs.4 The powers of state-chartered
banks have likewise expanded as most states enacted "wildcard" statutes,
permitting their state chartered banks to engage in the same activities
permissible for national banks.4 5 Banks can conduct, among other things,
certain financial, investment and economic advisory services; provide
transactional advice; and engage in various insurance and annuities
activities as well as securities activities.4 6
1. Permissible Financial, Investment and Economic Advisory Services
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") expanded the powers of national banks, and
therefore state banks (as a result of state wildcard statutes),47 to include
providing certain financial advisory services to customers.48 For example,
national banks may serve as the advisory company for a mortgage or real
estate investment trust, provide consumer financial counseling, furnish
economic information and advice (including economic statistical
43. E.g., Wall Street Bank Involvement With Physical Commodities: Hearing
Before S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 113th Cong. 313, 322 (2014)
(statement of Daniel K. Taurollo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20l41121a.htm (noting
that the Federal Reserve issued advance notice of proposed rulemaking in January 2014
requesting public comment regarding imposing further "prudential restrictions or
limitations on the ability of financial holding companies to engage in commodities-
related activities." He noted that the Federal Reserve received 184 unique comments
and over 16,900 form letters and that, since November 2014, it has been assessing "the
potential risk of physical commodities activities to the safety and soundness of the
financial holding companies engaged in these activities" and considering what steps to
take).
44. See generally OCC, supra note 11 (listing the broad array of activities national
banks and their subsidiaries may engage in today).
45. Blair & Kushmeider, supra note 11, at 14.
46. See generally OCC, supra note 11 (listing the different activities).
47. A "state wild card statute" provides that a state bank may engage in the same
banking powers as those enjoyed by a National Bank. See Christian A. Johnson, Wild
Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks - The Renascence of State Banking Powers,
26 LOYOLA UNIV. CHI. L.J. 351, 351 (1995).
48. See generally OCC, supra note 11, at 7,10,47,49,52.
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forecasting services), furnish industry studies, engage in financial
consulting and advisory services for other financial institutions and the
public, offer fiscal planning advice regarding structuring bond issues to
municipalities, and provide tax planning and preparation services. 49
Additionally, national banks may provide employee benefit consulting
services to corporations in connection with establishing qualified benefit
plans. Moreover, a national bank's operating subsidiary is authorized to
provide benefits counseling to customers (including collecting and
disbursing Medicare and Medicaid insurance benefit payments), credit card
registration and notification services, and payroll processing services, etc.5"
2. Transactional Advice
The OCC has also expanded permissible bank activities to include
providing transactional advice.52 This expansion of power includes, but is
not limited to, the ability to arrange for commercial real estate equity
financing, conduct financial feasibility studies, and provide financial and
transactional advice in relation to mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures,
recapitalizations, leveraged buyouts, and other financial transactions.5
3. Insurance and Annuities Activities
By the mid-1990s, national bank powers further expanded to include
authority to engage in certain types of insurance- and annuities-related
activities.54 Generally, national banks may sell insurance products as
agents on a nationwide basis provided they comply with the requirements
of 12 U.S.C. § 92 . Furthermore, banks may act as an agent selling a full
range of annuities.56  In addition to acting as agents, national banks are
49. id. at 7-10.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 7-8.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 47-52.
55. A national bank with a branch location in town with less than 5000 residents
may sell insurance as an agent through that office on a national basis. See id. at 49.
While 12 U.S.C. § 92 provides that a bank with less than 5000 residents may sell
insurance, the OCC interpreted that provision to allow such a branch to offer for sale
insurance products to customers nationwide in 1986. Furthermore, a national bank
need not be headquartered in such small town; it only needs to have a branch in that
town through which the insurance is offered. In 1993, over the objection of agents
companies, the D.C. Circuit confirmed the OCC's position. See Independent Insurance
Agents of America v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Letter
from Judith A. Walter, Senior Deputy Comptroller, OCC, to Randall R. Kaplan, Caplin
& Drysdale (June 13, 1986) (on file with author).
56. OCC, supra note 11, at 48. See generally NationsBank of North Carolina v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
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permitted to sell credit life insurance and may underwrite a variety of
insurance products, including credit life, health, disability, and mortgage
life insurance. 7 Additionally, a national bank may establish an operating
subsidiary to serve as a captive insurance company to underwrite the
bank's own operating risks.
58
4. Securities Activities
Perhaps, most notably, the scope of permissible activities now includes a
wide range of securities activities. 59 Banks may purchase and sell asset-
backed obligations and securitize certain assets, may execute and clear
securities transactions, and may act as a transfer and fiscal agent.60 Banks
may also engage in various types of broker-dealer activities such as
transactions for "trust customers, private placements, issuance and sales of
certain asset-backed securities, transactions for certain stock purchase
plans, and transactions in "identified banking products" (including
generally deposit instruments, banker's acceptances, loan participations
(subject to certain sales restrictions), and derivatives)., 61 They may even
offer investment advice for and engage in certain derivative activities (e.g.,
swaps, forwards, and options) as a financial intermediary or for risk
reduction purposes. 62 Moreover, banks can provide full-service securities
brokerage and act as a futures commission merchant.
63
The activities listed above represent merely a sampling of the activities
permissible for banks. The gradual expansion of bank powers may have
eroded many banks' need for a BHC structure.
IV. DIMINISHING ADVANTAGES OF THE BHC MODEL
Although BHCs may still engage in a wider range of activities, the gap
between permissible BHC and permissible bank business has narrowed.
Given the evolution and expansion of bank powers as discussed above,
arguably, many of the advantages of operating within the BHC structure
have eroded.
As discussed infra in Part IV, a BHC-electing financial holding company
status can engage in activities that are "financial in nature" such as
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance activities, and certain
securities activities beyond what was permissible for a bank without a
57. OCC, supra note 11, at 48.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 52-65.
60. Id. at 52, 57.
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 55.
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holding company. 64 However, since the promulgation of the Volcker Rule,
the ability of BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries to engage in many
securities and investment activities has been substantially diminished,65
decreasing one of the major advantages of the BHC structure. Moreover,
the OCC now permits bank operating subsidiaries to engage in certain
insurance, securities and other activities, 66 further eroding this business
advantage.
The waning benefits of the BHC structure are not limited to the reduced
gap between authorized BHC and bank activities. Other traditional BHC
benefits have also diminished or evaporated. Historically, for example, the
BHC structure was the primary means of acquiring and holding multiple
bank subsidiaries due to interstate banking prohibitions. 67  However,
starting in 1980, national banks could own operating subsidiaries,
68
financial subsidiaries,69 and bank service companies70 and maintain certain
64. See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, supra note
1.
65. See generally Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); 12
C.F.R. §§ 248.3, 248.10 (2015).
66. For example, the OCC permits national bank operating subsidiaries to, among
other things, operate as a captive insurance company to underwrite insurance coverages
on the operating risks of the parent bank and its affiliates, sell title insurance as an
agent, continue to conduct grandfathered title insurance activities, and engage in many
types of securities broker-dealer activities, including transactions for trust customers,
private placements, issuance and sales of certain asset-backed securities, transactions
for certain stock purchase plans, and transactions in "identified banking products." See
OCC, supra note 11, at 48.
67. See Baradaran, supra note 27, at 400 (indicating that, before the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking Act, interstate bank prohibitions provided BHCs with a competitive
advantage as the primary way to engage in banking in multiple states); Carl A. Sax &
Marcus H. Sloan III, Legislative Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1208 (1971).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) (defining an operating subsidiary as "a corporation,
limited liability company, limited partnership, or similar entity if: (A) The bank has the
ability to control the management and operations of the subsidiary, and no other person
or entity exercises effective operating control over the subsidiary or has the ability to
influence the subsidiary's operations to an extent equal to or greater than that of the
bank; (B) The parent bank owns and controls more than 50 percent of the voting (or
similar type of controlling) interest of the operating subsidiary, or the parent bank
otherwise controls the operating subsidiary and no other party controls a percentage of
the voting (or similar type of controlling) interest of the operating subsidiary greater
than the bank's interest; and (C) The operating subsidiary is consolidated with the bank
under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)").
69. Id. § 5.39(d)(6) (defining a financial subsidiary as "any company that is
controlled by one or more insured depository institutions, other than a subsidiary that:
(i) Engages solely in activities that national banks may engage in directly and that are
conducted subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of these
activities by national banks; or (ii) A national bank is specifically authorized to control
by the express terms of a Federal statute (other than Section 5136A of the Revised
Statutes), and not by implication or interpretation, such as by Section 25 of the Federal
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other equity investments.71
Moreover, the previously preferential treatment of debt at the BHC level
has largely evaporated. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the BHC structure facilitated
double leverage where a BHC could engage in trust preferred securities
("TruPS") financing, which could be counted as capital at the BHC level
and where the proceeds could be counted as Tier 1 capital at the bank
level.72 By way of background, TruPS are a type of debt instrument issued
generally by a special purpose subsidiary of the BHC (often the bank), and
the proceeds generally are loaned to the BHC pursuant to a long-term,
subordinated note.73 The BHC's loan payments are eventually used to
make dividend payments to the TruPS investors; 74 however, BHCs
generally retain generous deferral options regarding repayments.75
Beginning in October 1996, the Federal Reserve allowed these kinds of
instruments to be treated as Tier 1 capital for BHCs.76 TruPS, along with
other cumulative preferred stock, were allowed to account for up to 25% of
a BHC's Tier 1 capital, provided that certain conditions were satisfied.7 7
This treatment represented a significant benefit of the BHC structure:
Given the capital treatment[,] ... TruPS presented BHCs with a way to
raise capital without diluting existing shareholders. TruPS also provided
BHCs with favorable tax treatment in that TruPS dividend payments are
tax deductible for the issuers, unlike dividends paid on preferred stock. A
final benefit to using TruPS is that the collateralized debt obligations
Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 601-604a), Section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
611-631), or the Bank Service Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.)").
70. Id. § 5.35(d)(1) (defining a bank service company as "a corporation or limited
liability company organized to provide services authorized by the Bank Service
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., all of whose capital stock is owned by one or
more insured depository institutions in the case of a corporation, or all of the members
of which are one or more insured depository institutions in the case of a limited liability
company") (emphasis added); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1863 (indicating that permissible
services include performing the following services "check and deposit sorting and
posting, computation and posting of interest and other credits and charges, preparation
and mailing of checks, statements, notices, and similar items, or any other clerical,
bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions performed for a depository
institution").
71. 45 Fed. Reg. 68587 (Oct. 15, 1980); see also 12 C.F.R. § 5.36 (permitting
national banks to make various types of equity investments pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
24(7) and other statutes).
72. Alan Faircloth, ViewPoint: Spotlight: A Guide to Trust Preferred Securities,
27 FIN. UPDATE 1 (2014), https://www.frbatlanta.org/banking/publications/financial-
update/2014/q 1/viewpoint/spotlight-guide-trust-preferred-securities.aspx.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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(CDOs) could be issued under SEC Rule 144A, which allowed TruPS
CDOs to be unregistered when issued to qualified institutional buyers
(QIB) through a broker-dealer and permitted CDO issuers and trustees to
provide very limited disclosures.
78
Post Dodd-Frank, this is no longer the case. The Collins Amendment to
Dodd-Frank, along with the related Federal Reserve rules and policies, has
largely eliminated TruPS and similar hybrid debt securities from being
included in regulatory capital.79
BHCs' historic director-and-officer-related advantages have likewise
deteriorated. BHCs once had an advantage over banks with respect to
director and officer liability. While banks were restricted by the corporate
governance provisions of the state of their headquarters, BHCs had the
flexibility to select their state of incorporation, allowing them to select
states with more favorable indemnification and liability laws. But, in 1986,
national banks were granted similar flexibility by the OCC,8 0 which
allowed national banks to adopt corporate governance provisions in their
bylaws from a number of jurisdictions, e.g., from the home state of the
bank, BHC, Delaware, or Model Business Corporation Act.81 Moreover,
indemnification by all banks and BHCs is subject to compliance with 12
U.S.C. § 1828(k) 82 and the FDIC's Golden Parachute and Indemnification
Rule. 83
78. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement Regarding
Treatment of Certain Collateralized Debt Obligations Backed by Trust Preferred
Securities Under the Rules Implementing Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Dec. 31,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131227al.pdf. In
assessing the relative merits of the BHC structure today, the authors note that, to the
extent the argument is made that the BHC presents increasing and burdensome
regulatory requirement imposed by the Dodd Frank Act, this in no way reflects on a
highly professional, knowledgeable and experienced Federal Reserve staff who have
more than capably implemented rules and policies required by law.
79. Id. (noting that TruPs no longer constitute Tier 1 capital for BHCs with greater
than $15 billion in assets).
80. 61 Fed. Reg. 4849, 4866 (Feb. 9, 1996).
81. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.2000 (2015).
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (granting FDIC authority to
prohibit or limit, by regulation or order, any golden parachute or indemnification
payment).
83. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 359.2, 359.3 (2012); see also id. § 359.2 ("No insured
depository institution or depository institution holding company shall make or agree to
make any golden parachute payment, except as provided in this part."). A "golden
parachute payment" is a compensation payment, subject to certain enumerated
exceptions, by a bank or bank holding company for the benefit of any current or former
institution affiliated party-such as a director or officer of the bank or BHC-and is
contingent on that person's employment termination. In such a case, both the person's
termination and scheduled payment must occur closely before or after there is a period
of insolvency, appointment of a conservator or receiver of the bank, regulatory notice
the bank or BHC is in a troubled condition, assignment of a 4 or 5 composite regulatory
Vol. 5:2202
2016 REVISITING THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE 203
BHCs have also lost their previous advantage with respect to director
and officer compensation. Initially, BHCs faced fewer regulatory
requirements on deferred compensation plans (e.g., salary continuation
plans), resulting in lower administrative costs related to such
compensation. 84 Currently, not only do safety and soundness guidelines
and the golden parachute provisions of the FDIC impose identical
limitations and prohibitions on BHC and bank level management severance
provisions, 85 but Section 956 of Dodd-Frank also requires the FBAs to
develop a rule to "curb excessive incentive compensation at financial
services organizations,' 86 which includes both banks and BHCs. 87
Although the FBAs have yet to issue a final rule, the draft rule proposed in
2011, if adopted, would subject BHCs and banks to the same stringent
requirements.
88
As the benefits of the BHC structure erode, its attractiveness as an
organizational model dwindles as well.
V. GROWING BHC REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS
As the financial crisis of 2008 was blamed, at least in part, on inadequate
supervision of the country's largest and most complex financial
institutions, 89 Dodd-Frank was passed to fundamentally overhaul the
examination rating for the bank, or the possibility of being subject to a proceeding to
terminate deposit insurance.
84. Tatiana V. Tkachenko, Legal Status of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs): U.S.
and European Bankruptcy Issues, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 573, 589 (2010).
85. See 12 U.S.C. 1828(k).
86. Francine McKenna, Dodd-Frank Rule to Curb Bank incentive Pay Likely Last
to Finish Line, MARKETWATCH (July 16, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/dodd-frank-rule-to-curb-bank-incentive-pay-likely-last-to-finish-line-20 15-0
7-16.
87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423-1432 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365)
[hereinafter "Dodd-Frank"].
88. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Agencies Seek
Comment on Proposed Rule on Incentive Compensation (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressbcreg/20110330a.htm. ("requir[ing]
compensation practices at regulated financial institutions to be consistent with three
principles-that compensation arrangements should appropriately risk and financial
rewards, be compatible with effective controls and risk management, and be supported
by strong corporate governance").
89. See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks at
the Citizen Budget Commission (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/yellen20150303a.htm (commenting on the importance of increased
Federal Reserve Bank oversight of large financial institutions); Ben S. Bemanke, then-
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement before the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20100902a.htm; President Barack Obama, Remarks on 21st
Century Financial Regulatory Reform, (Jun. 17, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
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financial regulatory system and ensure that federal regulators actively
managed all financial institutions to mitigate risks. 90 Dodd-Frank granted
the Federal Reserve sweeping new powers to regulate large financial
institutions and directed the Federal Reserve to impose "heightened
prudential standards" in a variety of categories, including leverage capital,
liquidity, stress testing, and risk management. 9' Dodd-Frank also directed
FBAs to issue upwards of 100 new finalized rulemakings.9 2 As a result, the
regulatory burden on financial institutions is considered to be at an all-time
high.93
While certain regulations only apply to BHCs with more than $250
billion in assets, Dodd-Frank also directed the Federal Reserve to impose
significant new regulatory burdens on all BHCs with consolidated assets
over $50 billion.94 For example, these BHCs must implement new "global
risk management frameworks" overseen by a required risk committee and a
chief risk officer ("CRO").95 BHCs with assets over $50 billion also are
now subject, or will eventually be subject, to the new modified liquidity
coverage ratio,9 6 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review ("CCAR")
plans,97  enhanced liquidity risk managements standards, single
counterparty credit limits, supervisory run stress tests,98 and a host of new
reporting requirements.9 9 The resulting compliance costs are substantial;
for instance, in 2015, Citigroup Inc. announced it had spent $180 million in
the-press-office/remarks-president-regulatory-reform [hereinafter "Obama Remarks"].
90. Obama Remarks, supra note 89 (describing the Administration's proposal for
the Dodd-Frank Act as "a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a
transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great
Depression")
91. Dodd-Frank, § 165, 124 Stat. at 1423-1432.
92. For a comprehensive report on the progress of all Dodd-Frank related
rulemaking, see DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT: FOURTH QUARTER
2015, 2 (Davis Polk & Wardell 2016), http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-
Rulemaking-Progress-Report/.
93. Id.
94. Dodd-Frank, § 165, 124 Stat. at 1423-1432.
95. Regulation YY, 12 C.F.R. §§ 252.22, 252.132 (2014).
96. Joint Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Banking Regulators
Finalize Liquidity Coverage Ratio (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20140903a.htm.
97. Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Amendments to the Capital Plan and
Stress Test Rules 2-3, 12, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
bcreg20151125al .pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
98. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 252.51-252.58.
99. See Dodd-Frank, § 165, 124 Stat. at 1423-1432. See generally 12 C.F.R. §§
249, 252. For a comprehensive analysis of enhanced prudential standards, see DAVIS
POLK, supra note 92.
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just a six month period preparing for its annual CCAR. 00
While many of the post Dodd-Frank requirements do not affect BHCs
with less than $50 billion in total assets, BHCs with total assets between
$10 billion and $50 billion have experienced their own steady increase in
regulatory burden. Particularly for many smaller banking entities, the
increased compliance costs have been difficult to bear. Publicly-traded
BHCs with over $10 billion in assets must adopt a risk committee that is
required to meet quarterly.' 0' The risk committee is charged with
establishing a risk management framework, which must incorporate
processes for independent evaluation of risk, managerial risk
responsibilities, and risk reporting. °2 Moreover, all BHCs with more than
$10 billion in assets must conduct annual stress tests and disclose these
tests to both their regulators and the public.1
0 3
The ramped-up regulations imposed on small BHCs have faced
considerable criticism, and many argue that the increased regulatory burden
greatly outweighs whatever risk small BHCs pose to the national
economy. °4  This trend toward heightened regulation is especially
disconcerting in light of the fact that Dodd-Frank does not require the
Federal Reserve to engage in any risk benefit analysis before it imposes
additional regulations. 0'
While BHCs face more regulatory requirements than ever before, many
of these heightened prudential standards do not apply to financial
institutions without holding companies.'0 6 Many of Dodd-Frank's most
100. Kevin Wack, How One Major Bank Got a Pass on the Fed's Stress Tests, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/national-regional/
how-one-major-bank-got-a-pass-on-the-feds-stress-tests- 1077836-1 .html.
101. 12 C.F.R. §§ 252.22, 252.132.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 252.14(3).; see also Compliance Implications of Crossing the $10 Billion
Asset Threshold, GRANT THORNTON (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.grantthornton.com
/issues/library/articles/financial-services/2015/BK/I 0-FIS-banking-crossing-ten-bill ion
-threshold.aspx.
104. Why One-Size-Fits-All Rules Could Hurt the Recovery: Weekly Wrap, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-one-size-
fits-all-rules-could-hurt-the-recovery-weekly-wrap-1073240-1.html; Carrie Sheffield,
Dodd-Frank is Killing Community Banks, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.forbes.co
m/sites/carriesheffield/2015/02/09/dodd-frank-is-killing-community-banks/#217dfcb94
5ca.
105. See Congressman Jeb Hensarling, Reining in a Sprawling Federal Reserve,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/reining-in-a-
sprawling-federal-reserve- 1447978230.
106. While the OCC, FDIC, and state banking regulators could apply similar
regulations to banks without holding companies-and perhaps would do so if there was
a sudden increase in non-BHC banks-they have generally not elected to do so. Cf 12
C.F.R. §§ 50, 329 (applying annual company run stress test requirements to all
depository institutions with over $10 billion in assets).
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strenuous requirements were written to exclusively target BHCs with over
$50 billion in assets and systematically important financial institutions
("SIFIs") as designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
("FSOC"). 10 7 National banks, state banks, and savings and loan holding
companies have generally not been subjected to the overwhelming
expansion of federal banking regulatory requirements.
10 8
Notably, banks with less than $50 billion in assets experience regulatory
advantages by not having a BHC. While all depository institutions must
engage in risk analysis, only BHCs must create a risk management policy,
which meets the heightened requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve,
and form a separate risk committee. 1 9  Additionally, only BHCs are
required to file quarterly Y- 11 reports containing financial statements for
their nonbank subsidiaries. "0
As the level of BHC regulation rises and the final rulemakings required
by Dodd-Frank are drafted and implemented, the regulatory burden on
BHCs increasingly reduces their value as an organizational structure."' In
addition to the growth of BHC regulations as a result of Dodd-Frank, the
BHC structure faces another significant disadvantage. While state and
national banks generally need only report to one federal regulator, the BHC
organizational structure faces the substantial regulatory compliance cost of
reporting to two regulators: the Federal Reserve for the BHC and the
bank's primary regulator." 12 The inefficiencies of double-reporting long
have been recognized by the federal government, but despite the
recommendation by a mid-1980s task force of the Department of Treasure
107. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423-1432
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 249, 252.
108. A particularly notable example is the United Services Automobile Association
("USAA"), which has assets of approximately $134 billion. See USAA, WE THE
MEMBERS 2014 REPORT TO MEMBERS (2014), https://content.usaa.com/mcontent/static
_assets/Media/report-to-member-2014.pdf?cacheid=1 896096673p. USAA has not
been designated as a SIFI, and as such, it has escaped many of the additional regulatory
costs imposed since Dodd-Frank. Wack, supra note 100. With the exception of
company-run stress tests, the Federal Reserve has not applied any of the enhanced
prudential standards created pursuant to savings and loan holding companies through
Dodd-Frank.
109. 12 C.F.R. § 252.
110. OCC, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK ON RELATED ORGANIZATIONS 20 (Aug.
2004), http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handb
ook/_pdf/pub-ch-related-orgs.pdf.
111. See also DAVIS POLK, supra note 92 (indicating that there are over twenty-five
remaining rulemakings requirements by Dodd-Frank that have not yet been
implemented).
112. LYNN S. FOX ET AL., SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, in THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 59-60 (June 2005), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf 5.pdf.
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to eliminate this inefficiency,1 13 Dodd-Frank instead reinforced this double-
reporting system.
VI. CERTAIN BHC ADVANTAGES REMAIN STANDING
Notwithstanding the erosion of advantages and mounting regulatory
burdens of the BHC structure, BHCs continue to offer certain key
advantages. For one, unlike a bank, a BHC may own up to 5% of the
voting shares of any other company without prior regulatory approval." 14
This additional authority makes BHCs far more efficient for investment
and initial business expansion purposes. Additionally, the BHC structure
facilitates international banking activities as a BHC has significantly
greater flexibility to engage in foreign nonbanking activities than many
banks," 15 which generally are restricted to establishing foreign branches or
investing in entities "principally engaged" in banking." 6  International
activities conducted by a BHC are exempt from § 4 of BHC Act's "closely
related to banking" requirement."i 7 Unlike its bank counterpart, a BHC
may acquire "shares of or activities conducted by, any company which
does no business in the United States except as incident to its international
or foreign business, if the Board by regulation or order determines .... the
exemption would not be substantially at variance with the purposes of the
Act."' 18
Furthermore, BHCs that qualify as financial holding companies
("FHCs") enjoy additional advantages, for FHCs may engage in activities
that are "financial in nature" beyond what is allowable for banks." 19 Only
BHCs, not banks, can qualify for FHC status, which allows them to engage
in securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting, insurance
agency activities, and merchant banking.' Although banks may affiliate
with an insurance underwriter and insurance sales and brokerage firm, only
FHCs may engage in virtually any insurance activity. 12 1 Moreover, FHCs
113. THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR THE MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 200 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
114. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C § 1843(c)(6) (2012).
115. This applies to U.S. bank holding companies and U.S. banks and not
necessarily to foreign banking organizations. See, e.g., id. § 1841(h)(2); 12 C.F.R. §
211.23.
116. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-31.
117. Id. § 1843(c)(13).
118. Id.
119. See generally id. § 1843.
120. Id. § 1843(k)(4).
121. See id. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (providing that an FHC may engage in any of the
following: "insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness,
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may use their merchant banking authority to acquire any ownership
interest-even 100% ownership-in any type of entity, including a
nonfinancial entity. 122
BHCs also benefit from greater flexibility in raising capital than banks,
which generally can only raise capital by issuing stock.123 In addition to an
increased ability to raise capital, a banking structure helmed by a BHC
facilitates better separation of a troublesome subsidiary from the bank to
preserve the bank's supervisory and credit ratings. 124 More generally, the
BHC structure can more effectively shield banks from potential veil-
piercing liability for the acts of its subsidiaries, including from
environmental regulatory risk. 25  Depending on a banking entity's
activities and liability risks, these advantages may continue to outweigh the
enhanced regulatory burdens of the BHC structure.
CONCLUSION
While maintaining a BHC remains necessary for most very large
financial institutions that engage in financial activities only permitted for
FHCs, a large number of community and regional banks conduct activities
that do not require a BHC. Many of the advantages that previously
encouraged banks to adopt the BHC model no longer exist, and those
advantages that remain may well be outweighed by the onerous and ever-
increasing regulatory burden imposed on BHCs. As the regulatory
framework has changed, the incentives to form a BHC have disappeared.
Currently, many banks appear to subject themselves to inefficient and
unnecessary costs by failing to evaluate whether forming or maintaining a
BHC is still advantageous. A bank should not simply assume a BHC is
necessary or advisable regardless of their particular business model, but
rather, it should make an informed assessment and decision as to the need
for a BHC in light of its operating plans.
disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or
broker for purposes of the forgoing").
122. Id. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (indicating that an FHC may engage in merchant banking
and that it remains allowable despite that the Volker Rule limiting this type of
investment).
123. Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, supra note 1.
124. Pauline B. Heller & Melanie L. Fein, Federal Bank Holding Company Law
§ 1.04[3], Law Journal Press, Release 27 (2011).
125. Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, supra note 1.
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